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The Commander in Chief  
The Fateful Decision of an American President 
 














To be president of the United States is to be lonely, very lonely at times of great decisions. 
I’d rather have lasting peace in the world than be president. I wish for peace, I work for 
peace, and I pray for peace continually. 
We can well afford to pay the price of peace.  
Our only alternative is to pay the terrible cost of war.  
― Harry Truman 
 
 
Writing to his mother and sister back in Grandview, Missouri, on April 12, 1945, Vice President 
Harry S. Truman passed along some exciting news: His coming radio address for Jefferson 
Day, which Franklin D. Roosevelt created to mark the third president’s birthday, would be 
broadcast nationwide the following evening. 
 
It was a Thursday morning, and Truman was presiding over the Senate, listening to a “windy 
senator” make “a speech on a subject with which he is in no way familiar.” The senator’s 
verbosity provided a break in the action for the vice president, which gave him a few minutes 
to dash a quick note home. “Turn on your radio tomorrow night and you’ll hear Harry make a 
Harry Truman, Courtesy of National Archives 
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Jefferson Day address to the nation,” he wrote. “It will be followed by the president, whom I’ll 
introduce.” 
 
Some 700 miles to the south, at his retreat in Warm Springs, Georgia, President Roosevelt 
had put the finishing touches on his own Jefferson Day speech. He had been working on it all 
week, and at one point proudly announced to his guests that he had completed the draft 
largely in his own hand. 
 
That morning, he sat for a portraitist, who diligently painted while Roosevelt chatted with his 
friends. Just as their table was being set for lunch, he 
complained of a sudden and piercing pain in his head. He 
slumped forward in his chair and never regained 
consciousness.  The two Jefferson Day addresses were 
never delivered. Truman had intended to conclude his 
remarks by saying, “The next voice you will hear will be that 
of the President of the United States.” But the American 
public never heard that introduction, and they never heard 
Franklin Roosevelt’s familiar voice again.”1 
 
The former Senator from Missouri was Vice President for 
82 days when Franklin Roosevelt died. 
  
After his swearing in, he was briefed by the Secretary of 
War about a new weapon. Truman wrote in his diary, “We 
have discovered the most terrible bomb in the history of 
the world.”  
 
The war cost millions of lives and endless suffering. He was determined to stop the bloodshed.  
  
The atomic bomb was his last resort.   
 
The President insisted the weapon be 
used on a military target. “I have told the 
Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson,” Truman 
wrote, “to use it so that military objectives 
and soldiers and sailors are the target 
and not women and children. Even if the 
Japs are savages, ruthless, merciless, 
and fanatic, we as the leader of the world 
for the common welfare cannot drop that 
terrible bomb on the old capital or the 
new.”2 
 
Three months into his presidency, 
Truman went to Germany to meet with 
Churchill and Stalin to decide the future 
of the postwar world and to establish peace and order and deal with the devastation and 





Unfinished Portrait of Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt, Courtesy National Archives 
The swearing in of Harry Truman on the death of Franklin 
Roosevelt, Courtesy National Archives 
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“How I hate this trip,” Truman wrote in his diary on the way to Potsdam. “But I have to make 
it, win, lose or draw. I am not working for any interest by the Republic of the United States. I 
am giving nothing away except to save starving people and even then I hope we can help them 
to help themselves.” 3 
 
Truman argued for human rights, free 
elections, industrial reconstruction, efforts to 
prevent famine, and work to save the 
millions of refugees, prisoners of war, and 
homeless wandering through the continent.   
 
During the conference, Truman became 
suspicious of Stalin and his intentions.  The 
lack of trust effected the outcome.   
 
At Potsdam, “The Big Three” of the United 
Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and the United 
States agreed to acknowledge Russian 
dominance of Eastern Europe; the transfer of 
millions of refugees to Polish and Soviet 
administered territories; creation of a 
Council of Foreign Ministers to deal with 
peace treaties; promises to introduce representative government in Germany; outlaw of the 
Nazi Party; accords on reparations and land 
boundaries; the trial of war criminals and the 
unconditional surrender of Japan, or face “total 
destruction.” 
 
Truman informed Stalin of the atom bomb. The 
Soviet dictator did not seem surprised.  
 
The President departed the conference with 
concerns and misgivings.   
 
The seeds of the Cold War were planted. 
 
Nazi Germany had been defeated. The Empire of 
Japan continued to fight in one bloody contest after 
another. 
 
The island of Okinawa fell on June 21st, after three 
months of vicious combat. 12,000 American lives 
were lost. Over 100,000 Japanese soldiers 
perished in the fighting and nearly 100,000 
civilians died. For military leaders, it was the shape 
of things to come.   
The war with Japan could last years. 
 
3 https://artsandculture.google.com/asset/_/WQHh450I_rlajw 
Winston Churchill, Harry Truman and Joseph Stalin at Potsdam, 
August 2, 1945, Courtesy National Archives 
US Flag raised over the island of Okinawa, June, 1945, 
Courtesy National Archives 
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The Commander in Chief faced a frightening choice. To invade Japan the Allies estimated a 
million casualties.  As many Japanese might die or be wounded in house-to-house combat.  
63 million leaflets were dropped across Japan for several months to warn civilians of air raids.  
67 Japanese cities were firebombed. Horrible destruction occurred.   










Kamikaze attacks had a powerful psychological impact on US military decision making. 3,800 
Japanese pilots died in the suicide attacks, sinking 34 navy ships, and killing 4,900 sailors. It 










      Kamikaze attack on a US Naval Vessel, Courtesy National Archives 
Kamikaze Pilots, Courtesy Japanese National Archives 
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Anti-surrender sentiment was strong in the 
Japanese military.  
 
The founder of the Kamikazes, Vice Admiral 
Onishi insisted 20 million lives would be 
sacrificed in a special attack effort against an 
invasion of Japan.  
 
Evidence pointed to the determination of 
the enemy not to lay down their arms. 
Truman was told the Japanese were 
ready to fight to the end rather than 
accept capitulation. 
 
After the Potsdam conference, Truman 
flew to England and boarded the USS 
Augusta which had taken him to 
Europe.  King George VI visited him 
on board as the British and US flags 
flew over the vessel.   
 
It was August 2, 1945.   
 
He made a decision that day that 
would thunder across the planet and 
set in motion the end of the war in 
the Pacific. 
 
Three days into the voyage, the 
chaplain held a prayer vigil.  Harry 
Truman was in the forward mess hall 
of the Augusta. 
 
The President prayed his judgement 
would stop the bloodshed.    
 
Father Curtis Tiernan of the Augusta led the sailors and the President in a hymn, “Faith of Our 
Fathers.”   
 
U.S. & British flags on USS Augusta , 1945. Courtesy,  
National Archives 
 
U.S. Navy heavy cruiser USS Augusta, 1945 Courtesy US Navy 
 
President Truman aboard the Augusta, 1945, Courtesy US Navy 
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As Truman prayed on the deck of the ship, thousands of miles away, a plane named the Enola 
Gay flew off the island of Tinian toward the Japanese mainland.   
 
It was 2:45 AM. 
 
The city of Hiroshima slept.   
 
It was an industrial center filled with factories and storage facilities for the Japanese war 
effort.  It was also a bustling city with 318,000 men, women, and children. 
 
Early in the morning of August 6, the Enola Gay reached Hiroshima. The sky was clear.  There 
was no antiaircraft fire.  The plane flew placidly across the sky of the city.  
 
The plane that dropped the first 
atomic bombs, The Enola Gay, 
August 1945.  
Courtesy, National Archives 
 
Atomic bombs over Hiroshima and Nagasaki, August 1945, courtesy of National Archives 
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At 8:15 AM it dropped the bomb.   
 
Thousands of lives evaporated in seconds. 
            
The tail gunner Bob Caron recalled what happened next:4 
 
It was an awesome sight… the mushroom cloud…was white on the outside and it was sort 
of a purplish black towards the interior, and it had a fiery red core, and it just kept boiling 
up.  
 
As we got further away, I could see the city…it was being covered with this low, bubbling 
mass. It looked like… molasses, let’s say, spreading out and running up into the foothills… 
covering the city. Flames in different spots (were) springing up. 
   
The copilot, Capt. Robert Lewis wrote: 
 
If I live a hundred years, I'll never quite get these few minutes out of my mind. Everyone 
on the ship is actually dumbstruck even though we had expected something fierce. I 
honestly have the feeling of groping for words to explain this or I might say, my God, what 









The crew members would later say they did not regret the dropping of the bomb.  They believed 
it hastened the culmination of the war and saved thousands of lives on both sides. 
 
“Capt. Theodore ‘Dutch’ Van Kirk, of Northumberland, Pennsylvania, said that ‘I honestly 
believe the use of the atomic bomb saved lives in the long run, but I pray no man will have to 
witness that sight again. Such a terrible waste, such a loss of life.’”5 
 
Sixteen hours after the attack on Hiroshima, 
President Truman called upon the Japanese to stop 
fighting. 
  
No response.  
 
Two days after the bombing of Hiroshima, the Soviet 
Union declared war on Japan and raided Japanese 
territory.   
 
The next day, a second nuclear device was 
unleashed on the city of Nagasaki. 80,000 people 
died instantly.6  
 
The nuclear age was born, along with the possibility 
of atomic war. 
 
To end the hostilities, the final decision lay in the 
hands of the Emperor of Japan. 
 
The Emperor wielded more power than originally 
believed. Historic examples showed Hirohito acting 
decisively like putting down a coup of military 
leaders in 1936; approval of the use of chemical 
weapons after the invasion of China; and tacit 
approval of the mistreatment of prisoners of war and the mass murder of civilians in Nanking. 
He endorsed the alliance with Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany and approved the attack on 
Pearl Harbor, over the objections of some of his advisors. “According to an aide, he showed 
visible joy at the news of the success of the surprise attacks.”7 
 
The Emperor had a chance to end the war earlier when it was clear Japan could not win.  In 
February, 1945, the Prime Minister implored Hirohito to begin negotiations for an end to the 
fighting. He refused, on the hope the Soviet Union would mediate a negotiated peace.   
Preserving the emperor’s office was a key concern of many Japanese officials, which led them 
to refuse demands for unconditional surrender. 
 
“Hirohito learned of the dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima about 12 hours after the 
fact, at 7:50 pm, Japan time, on August 6, 1945. Two days later, the Emperor admitted that 
the war could not continue. But neither the Emperor nor the Japanese Cabinet accepted 
unconditional surrender, at that time. On August 9, the second bomb was dropped on 




6 UShistory.org, “The Decision to Drop the Atom Bomb” (http://www.ushistory.org/us/51g.asp) 
7 https://www.atomicheritage.org/profile/emperor-hirohito 




meeting with other leaders, Hirohito declared his intention to accept the Potsdam 
Declaration.”8 
 
It was still not the culmination of the war.  Japanese officials continued to debate how imperial 
power could be maintained. An unsuccessful coup was put down during the discussions by 
those wanting to continue the struggle. 
 
“Hirohito’s decision proved decisive: his loss of 
faith in the war effort corralled both politicians 
and military men who might have prolonged the 
war. He announced the surrender to the nation 
in an historic radio broadcast, the first time an 
Emperor had ever addressed the nation in such 
a manner. The “Jewel Voice Broadcast,’ 
delivered in formal, florid Japanese, was 
notable both for what Hirohito did not say―he 
never used the word ‘surrender’―and what he 
did say. He both continued to justify Japan’s 
earlier aggression, and put forth a new national 
mission that was very different than the 
ideology of kodo. (Subordination of the 
individual to the state.)  ‘To strive for the 
common prosperity and happiness of all nations 
as well as the security and well-being of our 
subjects.’ The Jewel Voice Broadcast also made 
reference to ‘a new and most cruel bomb, the 
power of which to damage is indeed 
incalculable.’”9  
 
Japanese leaders and the Emperor also feared 
a popular uprising if the conflict did not cease. 
 
Emperor Hirohito ordered the Supreme Council for the Direction of the War to accept the Allied 
terms of surrender.  
 
The war with Japan ended on August 15, 1945, 95 days after Harry Truman became 
Commander in Chief. 
 
The day after the Emperor’s decision, Vice Admiral Onishi took his own life rather than give 
up.  “I wish to express my deep appreciation to the souls of the brave special attackers,” he 
wrote in his suicide note. “They fought and died valiantly with faith in our ultimate victory. In 
death I wish to atone for my part in the failure to achieve that victory and I apologize to the 
souls of those dead fliers and their bereaved families. 
 
I wish the young people of Japan to find a moral in my death. To be reckless is only to aid the 
enemy. You must abide by the spirit of the Emperor's decision with utmost perseverance. Do 
not forget your rightful pride in being Japanese. 
 
8 Ibid. https://www.atomicheritage.org/profile/emperor-hirohito 
9 Ibid. https://www.atomicheritage.org/profile/emperor-hirohito 





You are the treasure of the nation. With all the fervor of spirit of the special attackers, strive 
for the welfare of Japan and for peace throughout the world.”10 
 
President Truman went on to make other historic decisions like the Marshall Plan to 
reconstruct Europe, the beginning of the United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) to protect the free nations of the continent from Soviet aggression.   
 
One year after the tragedy of Hiroshima, Truman created the Atomic Energy Commission for 
the peaceful use of nuclear power. 
 
Historians, philosophers, and writers still debate the morality and need of such a weapon of 
mass destruction to end the conflict.  Perhaps another President would have taken a different 
approach.   
 
We will never know.  
  
What we do know is that Truman showed character, courage, decisiveness, and responsibility 




10 https://ww2db.com/person_bio.php?person_id=170  






Thoughts over the Use of the Atomic Bomb to End the War with Japan 
“Some Americans recall the event with shame and express their fervent hope that nuclear 
weapons never be used again. Others firmly believe that the use of atomic bombs saved 
American lives by ending the war prior to a bloody American invasion of Japan. More 
challenging to consider is whether it was an unjustifiable act in a fully justified war.”11 
 
Reflection on the morality of the event is expressed in the following thoughts. 
 
The atomic bomb made the prospect of future war unendurable. It has led us up those last 
few steps to the mountain pass; and beyond there is a different country.   
— J. Robert Oppenheimer 
 
As human beings, our greatness lies not so much in being able to remake the world — that is 
the myth of the atomic age — as in being able to remake ourselves. — Mahatma Gandhi 
 
There are voices which assert that the bomb should never have been used at all. I cannot 
associate myself with such ideas. . . . I am surprised that very worthy people—but people who 
in most cases had no intention of proceeding to the Japanese front themselves—should adopt 
the position that rather than throw this bomb, we should have sacrificed a million American 
and a quarter of a million British lives. — Winston Churchill 
 
But they (the Japanese) also showed a meanness and viciousness towards their enemies 
equal to the Huns. Genghis Khan and his hordes could not have been more merciless. I have 
no doubts about whether the two atom bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were 
necessary. Without them, hundreds of thousands of civilians in Malaya and Singapore, and 
millions in Japan itself, would have perished. — Lee Kuan Yew, the Former Prime Minister of 
Singapore 
 
The intercepts of Japanese Imperial Army and Navy messages disclosed without exception 
that Japan's armed forces were determined to fight a final Armageddon battle in the homeland 
against an Allied invasion. The Japanese called this strategy Ketsu Go (Operation Decisive). It 
was founded on the premise that American morale was brittle and could be shattered by heavy 
losses in the initial invasion. American politicians would then gladly negotiate an end to the 
war far more generous than unconditional surrender. — Richard B. Frank, Historian 
 
The Japanese code of Bushido—'the way of the warrior'—was deeply ingrained. The concept of 
Yamato-damashii equipped each soldier with a strict code: Never be captured, never break 
down, and never surrender. Surrender was dishonorable. Each soldier was trained to fight to 
the death and was expected to die before suffering dishonor. Defeated Japanese leaders 
preferred to take their own lives in the painful samurai ritual of seppuku (called hara kiri in 
the West). Warriors who surrendered were deemed not worthy of regard or respect.  
— John T. Correll 
 
Much of the confusion involves the definition of terms like ‘surrender.’ The Japanese did 
indeed float various schemes to end the war, but on terms that were totally unacceptable to 





of militarism or imperialism, and no punishment of war criminals. No retaliation for the savage 
crimes in China, the East Indies, and elsewhere. Then, after a hiatus of a couple years, Japan 
would launch the next wave of aggression. They were clearly not talking ‘surrender’ in any 
sense of the term we might recognize. ... When we consider the toll of not dropping the bombs, 
always remember the many thousands of civilians who were dying under Japanese occupation 
in China and Indonesia throughout 1945, and we should continue counting the deaths that 
would have occurred at that rate through 1946. Nothing was going to stop that short of the 
total destruction of Japanese war-making capacity. Add to this the murder of all Allied POWs 
in Japanese hands, as the Japanese had ordered in the event of a direct attack on the 
mainland. Put those figures together, together with likely Japanese fatalities, you get about 
ten million dead — and that is a conservative figure. Most of those additional deaths would 
have been East and Southeast Asians, mainly Japanese and Chinese. — Philip Jenkins 
 
In 1945, Secretary of War Stimson, visiting my headquarters in Germany, informed me that 
our government was preparing to drop an atomic bomb on Japan. I was one of those who felt 
that there were a number of cogent reasons to question the wisdom of such an act. During 
his recitation of the relevant facts, I had been conscious of a feeling of depression, and so I 
voiced to him my grave misgivings, first on the basis of my belief that Japan was already 
defeated and that dropping the bomb was completely unnecessary, and secondly because I 
thought that our country should avoid shocking world opinion by the use of a weapon whose 
employment was, I thought, no longer mandatory as a measure to save American lives.  
— Dwight David Eisenhower  
 
The Japanese had, in fact, already sued for peace. The atomic bomb played no decisive part, 
from a purely military point of view, in the defeat of Japan. 
 — Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Commander in Chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet 
 
The use of [the atomic bombs] at Hiroshima and Nagasaki was of no material assistance in 
our war against Japan. The Japanese were already defeated and ready to surrender because 
of the effective sea blockade and the successful bombing with conventional weapons. ... The 
lethal possibilities of atomic warfare in the future are frightening. My own feeling was that in 
being the first to use it, we had adopted an ethical standard common to the barbarians of the 
Dark Ages. I was not taught to make war in that fashion, and wars cannot be won by destroying 
women and children.  
—  Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, Chief of Staff to President Truman, 1950 
 
The atomic bomb had nothing to do with the end of the war at all.  
— Major General Curtis Lemay, XXI Bomber Command, September 1945 
 
The first atomic bomb was an unnecessary experiment . . . . It was a mistake to ever drop it . 
. . [the scientists] had this toy and they wanted to try it out, so they dropped it.  
— Fleet Admiral William Halsey Jr., 1946 
 
On the basis of available evidence, however, it is clear that the two atomic bombs . . . alone 
were not decisive in inducing Japan to surrender. Despite their destructive power, the atomic 
bombs were not sufficient to change the direction of Japanese diplomacy. The Soviet invasion 
was. Without the Soviet entry in the war, the Japanese would have continued to fight until 
numerous atomic bombs, a successful allied invasion of the home islands, or continued aerial 
bombardments, combined with a naval blockade, rendered them incapable of doing so.  
— Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, Japanese Historian 
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Military vulnerability, not civilian vulnerability, accounts for Japan's decision to surrender. 
Japan's military position was so poor that its leaders would likely have surrendered before 
invasion, and at roughly the same time in August 1945, even if the United States had not 
employed strategic bombing or the atomic bomb. Rather than concern for the costs and risks 
to the population, or even Japan's overall military weakness vis-a-vis the United States, the 
decisive factor was Japanese leaders’ recognition that their strategy for holding the most 
important territory at issue—the home islands—could not succeed.   
— Robert Pape 
Let me say only this much to the moral issue involved: Suppose Germany had developed two 
bombs before we had any bombs. And suppose Germany had dropped one bomb, say, on 
Rochester and the other on Buffalo, and then having run out of bombs she would have lost 
the war. Can anyone doubt that we would then have defined the dropping of atomic bombs 
on cities as a war crime, and that we would have sentenced the Germans who were guilty of 
this crime to death at Nuremberg and hanged them?  
— Leó Szilárd, physicist who played a role in the Manhattan Project 
 
 
Emilio Iodice is author of the new book, The Commander in Chief, The Qualities Needed of 
Leaders of Freedom-Loving Nations in the 21st Century, Lessons from American Presidential 
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